La F1 2018 vista dai parametri Pirelli

Ciao Ringers! Siamo quasi giunti alla fine della pausa estiva, con l’imminente accensione dei motori sul mitico circuito di Spa-Francorchamps ed è alta l’attesa per la ripresa del duello Hamilton-Vettel e Mercedes-Ferrari. Durante l’ultimo mese la discussione si è concentrata sui rapporti di forza fra le squadre in lizza per il campionato, sugli errori di piloti e muretto, sugli sviluppi portati in pista da Melbourne a Budapest; si è potuto leggere l’opinione di giornalisti, esperti, addetti ai lavori, appassionati su qualsiasi argomento riguardante la F1, tranne forse alcuni dettagli probabilmente non da poco, sempre trascurati nelle analisi dei GP, ma dei quali Pirelli fornisce un preciso e dettagliato rendiconto gara dopo gara.

Si tende sempre a dimenticare che qualsiasi sforzo profuso dai progettisti in fabbrica e dagli ingegneri di pista con i piloti nel fine settimana, verte fondamentalmente su un singolo obiettivo: riuscire a far lavorare nel modo più corretto, così da sfruttarne il massimo potenziale e garantirne una durata tale da adottare la strategia più rapida e vincere la corsa.

Per riuscire in questo intento, oltre ai parametri meccanici, aerodinamici e motoristici, è di fondamentale importanza l’assetto della vettura. Spesso si parla di bilanciamento fra carico anteriore e posteriore ma si trascura la parte meccanica che fornisce il bilanciamento delle rigidezze, data dal sistema sospensivo e dalle caratteristiche meccaniche del gruppo ruota.

In questo articolo si parlerà proprio di questo aspetto della vettura, spesso troppo trascurato nelle varie analisi tecniche di giornali e web.

La rigidezza dell’assale anteriore e di quello posteriore può essere, per semplicità, ridotta ad una serie di due sistemi massa-molla-smorzatore; di questi uno è dato dal sistema sospensivo, l’altro dallo pneumatico.

Il comportamento di quest’ultimo non è però costante;  non solo le caratteristiche del veicolo e la costruzione dello pneumatico, ma anche gli angoli caratteristici della ruota e la pressione di gonfiaggio influenzano i valori k2 e b2.

In particolare, sono fondamentali la pressione e l’angolo di camber, ovvero l’angolo di inclinazione dell’asse verticale della ruota rispetto alla perpendicolare al terreno. Tale angolo, per convenzione, è negativo se la ruota è inclinata verso l’interno, come mostrato nella figura seguente.

Questi due parametri influiscono principalmente sull’impronta a terra dello pneumatico in condizioni statiche e dinamiche, inoltre determinano la rigidezza e lo smorzamento caratteristici del sistema massa-molla-smorzatore relativo al gruppo ruota.

All’aumentare (in valore assoluto) del camber e/o della pressione di gonfiaggio si ottiene un’impronta a terra ridotta, utile per scaldare rapidamente lo pneumatico in condizioni climatiche difficili ma allo stesso tempo fortemente stressante per la gomma, la quale si scalda sempre in una zona molto ridotta della sua larghezza e tende ad usurarsi più rapidamente in tale fascia, mentre il resto della superficie rimane praticamente inutilizzato. Da considerare, per quanto riguarda il camber, che questo viene misurato in condizioni statiche, cioè quando la macchina è ai box; in marcia, grazie agli impegni laterali ed al rollio che ne consegue, le sospensioni permettono di aumentare l’impronta a terra riallineando la ruota alla verticale (tale fenomeno è detto “recupero del camber”). Tanto più morbida sarà la vettura da un punto di vista sospensivo, tanto maggiore sarà la capacità di recuperare camber e quindi di partire con camber statico elevato. Una vettura settata per essere estremamente rigida non troverà alcun beneficio prestazionale dall’aumento del camber statico oltre certi valori, perché in curva non avrà sufficiente rollio da permetterne il recupero con conseguente aumento dell’impronta a terra. La scelta del camber è quindi influenzata anche dalle caratteristiche sospensive del veicolo.

Per quanto riguarda la pressione di gonfiaggio in F1 si cerca sempre di rimanere su valori estremamente bassi. Tenendo presente che 1 bar corrisponde a circa 14.5 psi, si ha che una pressione di 20 psi corrisponde a poco meno di 1.4 bar, contro i circa 2.5 ai quali vengono gonfiate le gomme di una vettura stradale. Il valore minimo di pressione viene cercato in modo che garantisca allo pneumatico di “funzionare”, cioè entrare nell’ormai famoso working range di lavoro.

A tal proposito è utile ricordare le finestre di funzionamento delle Pirelli di questa stagione:

Si può notare che da quest’anno tutte le gomme morbide hanno una finestra di utilizzo alle basse temperature, mentre dalla S fino alla SH si hanno valori elevati; nelle scorse stagioni invece la M era una mescola “low working range” e la S una “high working range”.

In pratica i team utilizzerebbero in gara le pressioni minime che consentono di far entrare la gomma nella temperatura di funzionamento, senza arrivare a scaldarla troppo ed uscire al di sopra del valore massimo nel corso dello stint. Pirelli, per questioni di sicurezza (a mio parere più di immagine aziendale), fornisce dei valori minimi per la pressione di gonfiaggio in griglia, che devono essere rispettati da regolamento; così è assicurato che la gomma funzioni in condizioni di sicurezza al fine di evitare forature e cedimenti strutturali nel passaggio sui cordoli. Per salvaguardare l’integrità dello pneumatico vengono inoltre forniti dei valori massimi di camber anteriore e posteriore, così da non sollecitare in modo eccessivo una zona ristretta della gomma, specialmente nei rettilinei, ed evitare problemi in gara.

Nella tabella successiva si possono vedere le scelte Pirelli per i GP di questa stagione, per quanto riguarda camber, pressioni e mescole adottate. Sono riportati anche i parametri determinati dal gommista per quanto riguarda la caratterizzazione del circuito.

 

Per il Canada e l’Austria rispettivamente Pirelli ha fornito un parametro diverso a gara; nel primo caso si ha l’impegno di trazione al posto dell’abrasività dell’asfalto, comunque bassa in quanto si tratta di un cittadino; nel secondo è indicato, al posto dello stress sulle gomme, l’impegno in frenata.

Rimane da considerare, come parametro non certo trascurabile, l’adozione in tre GP (Spagna, Francia e Gran Bretagna) degli pneumatici con battistrada ribassato di 0.4 mm.

Qui di seguito sono riportate alcune considerazioni che possono essere fatte con l’osservazione dei soli dati relativi agli pneumatici ed ai parametri imposti da Pirelli. Nessuna considerazione ha la presunzione di essere “vera”, anzi questo pezzo ha l’intento principale di concentrare per una volta la discussione su grandezze solitamente trascurate nelle analisi precedenti e successive ai GP.

  1. Nei fine settimana in cui Pirelli ha imposto una bassa differenza nelle pressioni di gonfiaggio fra anteriore e posteriore Ferrari è sembrata, quantomeno in gara, più a suo agio con gli pneumatici. In particolare, si può notare che se a questa bassa differenza è associata la scelta di gomme molto morbide (US in Ungheria, Germania ed Azerbaijan, HS a Monaco), il divario sul passo gara fra i due top team si amplifica ulteriormente.
  2. Nei circuiti con forte impegno laterale ed elevato stress sulla gomma la Mercedes è sembrata estremamente competitiva (Spagna, Francia, Gran Bretagna), anche se a viziare tale considerazione c’è la questione gomme ribassate, che sicuramente ha avuto una sua influenza sulle prestazioni delle vetture.
  3. Ad esclusione dell’Australia, GP in cui ancora la Ferrari non era in grado di mostrare il suo effettivo potenziale, e della Francia (gomme dure e ribassate), Mercedes sembra meno a suo agio quando Pirelli permette elevati valori di camber all’anteriore in combinazione con compound morbidi (esempio eclatante Monaco, GP in cui, nonostante l’impegno sulla gomma sia estremamente basso, Mercedes soffriva più di tutti di blistering nei long run).

Da queste considerazioni si possono provare ad azzardare alcune ipotesi sulle caratteristiche delle due vetture di vertice, almeno per quanto riguarda le criticità nelle scelte di assetto.

Sembrerebbe che il progetto Ferrari garantisca in generale una maggiore uniformità di comportamento dei due assi e quindi sia minore la necessità di differenziare le scelte di setup fra anteriore e posteriore. Questo comporterebbe un maggior equilibrio che si esalta quando i parametri di assetto sugli pneumatici imposti da Pirelli impediscono grosse variazioni fra anteriore e posteriore; in particolare il maggior equilibrio permette di stressare meno lo pneumatico e dà quindi la possibilità di adottare un camber più accentuato sull’anteriore senza minare la durata della gomma nei long run, specialmente con composti morbidi.

Al contrario pare che in casa Mercedes ci sia la necessità di equilibrare la vettura con variazioni di assetto un po’ più spinte fra anteriore e posteriore, con la conseguenza di avere una monoposto ben più performante quando Pirelli permette tali scelte. Tale fenomeno potrebbe amplificarsi con gli pneumatici più duri perché soffrono evidentemente meno dello stress provocato da una vettura più “estrema” che stressa maggiormente le gomme.

Nelle prossime ore dovrebbero essere resi noti i valori scelti da Pirelli per pressioni e camber in vista di Spa che potrebbero essere determinanti per il risultato della gara fra le Ardenne.

Ciao!

MIDFIELD ANALYSIS

Did McLaren destroy Alonso or did Alonso destroy McLaren?

 

After I had written and published my first analysis, in which I looked at the race performance of Ocon, Gasly and Leclerc over the first 12 races of this season, I thought of doing the same thing with 3 prominent midfield drivers.

 

The analysis of Ocon, Gasly and Leclerc was to look at their race performance and try to ascertain whether it justified either one of them being considered to move up to the main team. The results seem to indicate that Ocon probably is ready to move to Mercedes, while it’s very questionable whether that holds true for both Gasly and Leclerc. Recent events have had an impact on that analysis. Ocon won’t be moving to Mercedes next year as Bottas was re-signed. I wonder if Hamilton is using a similar system and decided he didn’t want Ocon as a team-mate. Ricciardo’s move to Renault may necessitate Red Bull to move Gasly into their main team, if they want to stick to promoting from within, as they have no other viable options. Hartley clearly isn’t qualified to be in a Red Bull, or F1 😉. And finally, Sergio Marchionne’s death, and the installation of Louis Camilleri as the new CEO, may cause Ferrari to keep things as they are, especially as Vettel and Arrivabene both indicate they want Räikkönen to stay.

 

While the analysis of the young drivers was to try and determine, as I mentioned above, whether they are ready to move up, the analysis of two of our mid-field drivers is to determine if starting right behind the top 6 of Ferrari, Mercedes and Red Bull (and usually scoring points in the process) is masking their true race performance. Our third driver is a two-time world champion who is hobbled by a (seemingly) bad car but likes to claim he is still one of the best, if not the best driver in F1 today.

 

The three drivers I’ll be looking at are: Haas’ Kevin Magnussen, Renault’s Nico Hulkenberg and last, but not least, Fernando Alonso of McLaren.

Since I had analysed Ocon in the previous article I decided I should look at the other top drivers of the midfield.

I haven’t made any changes in the metrics that I used when looking at Ocon, Gasly and Leclerc

First up: Kevin Magnussen

I don’t think there can be much doubt that Magnussen has been the best driver at Haas this season. He has out-qualified Grosjean 9 – 3, outscored him 45 – 21. Magnussen has only had one DNF compared to four for Grosjean, and that was a team mistake when his wheel wasn’t properly attached in Australia.

The first thing you notice about Magnussen is his adjusted grid position gains him, on average, almost 1 place. He then loses that gain in his race result. In 45% of races he has lost final race positions compared to his adjusted grid position start. And cumulatively he has lost 1 place.

Second Up: Nico Hulkenberg

It’s clear that Renault are at the top of the mid-field, currently 4th in the Constructors World Championship, 16 points ahead of Haas. While Hulkenberg and Sainz are tied 6 – 6 in qualifying, Hulkenberg has outscored Sainz 52 -30 and did it while have having 2 more DNF’s. Hulkenberg is gaining on average 1.3 positions when his grid position is adjusted and another 0.5 positions for his final race. Only twice out of the 9 races he finished, he has lost places and cumulatively has gained 5 places.

And finally: Alonso

Alonso gains 2.6 places on the grid when his starting grid position is adjusted. He gains another 2.7 places from his adjusted start to finishing position. He gains a massive 21 cumulative places over the 8 races he finishes!

 

Conclusion

 

Only one driver of the three, Hulkenberg, was close to what I believed he would do before I started this analysis. I’ll be honest and state that I’ve never rated Hulkenberg as a great driver, but as journeyman mid-field one. The best word that you could use to describe him is consistent. 5 times out of 9 races he’s qualified 7th. In his true positions gained, he picks up one or two in one race and drops them in another. It’s fairly clear that the Renault is the best car In the mid-field, yet regardless of where he starts and on what kind of track he is racing on, he seems unable to really standout. I believe I see now why Renault decided to keep him instead of Sainz and it comes back to being consistent, something which Sainz isn’t. I see Hulkenberg’s role next season as being similar to Riccardo Patrese’s at Williams, when Mansell was his teammate. You’re not here to lead the team but be a safe set of hands that will not make mistakes and maximize the points you score. And for Hulkenberg this role marks him now as a forever number 2.

When I first looked at Magnussen’s chart my first impression was I had done something wrong. The Haas team have made great strides and the new Ferrari engine, which I believe is now the best in F1, has been a big part of this season’s success. Guenther Steiner, the Haas team principal, has made many positive comments about Magnussen; saying he has really upped his game this season.

 

Yet I come back to my chart and I’m afraid I don’t see it. Yes, Haas is doing better because they have a better car, but Magnussen cumulatively has lost a position. In 5 races out of 11 he’s lost places. It looks to me like Magnussen is a qualifying specialist and an average race driver, who can put his car high on the grid but doesn’t have the race pace to keep it there. 8 times Magnussen, when grid adjusted, has qualified 10th or better, yet only twice has he gained any positions. I get the sense that the Haas car is making Magnussen look a lot better than he really is. I would like to see Haas replace Grosjean with Leclerc and keep Magnussen in much the same role as Hulkenberg will have at Renault, a solid driver who can score points as I don’t think Magnussen has the talent to take Haas any further than it is now.

 

And finally, Alonso… It’s hard to know where to start with Alonso. If you don’t adjust his grid position and look at his final race position, he is on average gaining 5.3 places a race. When grid adjusted its 2.7 places. Cumulatively he has gained 21 places from his adjusted position over 8 races. Those are massive position gains. Some will simply say that Alonso is the best driver around – that’s why. But there are still a lot of questions I have.

 

The main question I have is: why can Alonso, it seems, easily pick up positions during the race, but can’t qualify his car well? Alonso’s average final race position is 7.2, which means he is finishing just behind the front runners of Ferrari, Red Bull and Mercedes. Yet his adjusted grid place is 9.9, meaning he is effectively on average, the worst Q3 qualifier.

 

That then begs the question is this a car issue or an Alonso issue. If it’s a car issue, the fault lies entirely with McLaren. And Boullier’s head rolled because of it. If however it’s an Alonso issue, meaning the car was essentially designed and is set-up for Alonso, and while in race trim it seems to suits Alonso perfectly, but it doesn’t in qualification, Boullier was a sacrificial lamb and McLaren have a much more serious problem. Brown has allowed Mclaren to effectively be turned into a one-car team to suit Alonso, as I believe Vandoorne isn’t as bad a driver as his record this season indicates.

 

If, as I speculate, Alonso has pushed Brown so McLaren focus on him to the detriment of Vandoorne, I can see why other teams, when coupled with his toxic influence within a team, are reluctant to consider him.

Doesn’t this mean the downfall of McLaren has only just begun? Rather than working towards a solution the will are feeding the problem even more…

Is the news that Alonso quits after this season good news for McLaren? Or did McLaren destroy Alonso’s career?

Let me know in the comments.

 

Article by Cavallino Rampante edited by Phil Bruznic

THE SPECTACULAR FAILURE OF LIFE

One of the most common and usually heated discussions in F1 is who or what, is or was the best. The best driver, car, engine or circuit provides endless debate. But sometimes who or what was the worst can actually be more interesting. And in this article I’m going to detail one of F1’s little known but maybe greatest team failure.

Today, as we are halfway through the 2018 F1 season, various groups within F1 are looking to come up with a new, maybe simpler, engine spec for 2021. However it turns out, one of the common statements made is that this new spec could encourage new engine supplier entrants into F1. Whether that actually happens or not, only time will tell. But there was a time the FIA did change the spec and made that claim and it did actually happen. This isn’t just a story of engines, but also about a team being formed because of their engine. Usually a team in F1 fails because it has a bad chassis or engine. Rarely do they ever get both wrong. And that is where or story begins.

Well, it actually starts a little bit earlier than that. The engines of the first turbo era were astounding pieces of engineering. The first Honda turbo in F1 in 1983, the RA163E, produced around 600HP. By 1987 the RA167E was producing about 850HP in race trim and 1200HP when set-up as a one lap qualifying wonder engine. Regulation changes for 1988 brought the HP of the RA168E down to around 725, but that was still 150+ HP more than the normally aspirated Cosworth DFR produced. F1 had evolved into a two-tiered sport with those who could afford turbo’s and those who couldn’t, or those who couldn’t get a turbo engine deal. Honda was reported to be spending $60M – $70M a year on their turbo engine program in the late 1980’s. Depending on what calculator you use, that is $125M – $150M in today’s money. That’s significantly more than Honda is spending today, rumoured to have been $100M at McLaren and $40M at Toro Rosso. It was clearly financially unsustainable and if left unchecked could have finished off F1. The FIA acted and for the 1989 season turbo’s were banned and the new F1 engine spec was 3.5L with no restriction on configuration.

In 1988 former Ferrari engine designer, Franco Rocchi, saw this as an opportunity to design an engine for the new 1989 F1 engine spec. Rocchi was no novice when it came to engine design, he was responsible for the engines in Ferrari’s 308 series in the late 1970’s an early 1980’s, but those were road cars. This would be his first F1 design. He believed that with 20 teams entered in the 1989 season there was bound to be a team willing to buy his design, as Subaru had done with another former Ferrari engine designer Carlo Chiti, and especially as Rocchi felt he had an ace up his sleeve in a W12 engine.

I’m sure most people reading this have no idea what a W12 engine is. Simply put, it uses 3 banks of 4 cylinders (which look like a W) instead of the traditional arrangement of 6 cylinders in 2 banks configured as a V. W configured engines weren’t new, they had been used in the aircraft industry since the 1930’s and occasionally in motorcycles. The advantage Rochi saw of using them in F1 was that while they are slightly taller than a V8 they were the same length and any of the Cosworth powered teams could easily fit the engine into their car and get the benefit of 4 extra cylinders. That was the theory.

 

By mid-1989 the design was finished. Rocchi didn’t have any success selling the concept to any F1 team but an Italian businessman named Ernesto Vita liked the idea and figured he could make a quick buck or lira selling the design to an F1 team, so he bought the rights to the design and Vita (which is Italian for life) named the new company Life Racing Engines.

Unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, Vita had no more success selling the W12 concept to any F1 team than Rocchi did. Teams were sceptical of the W12’s radical design. It was safer to go with an engine from a proven company like Cosworth. At this point most people would have walked away and realized they had made a mistake buying the engine’s design. But not Vita. With an F1 engine he decided the smart way to go was to form his own F1 team, and Life Racing was born.

Vita’s big problem was he didn’t have an F1 chassis to put his engine in. Luckily he found that First Racing had designed a chassis which they intended to run in 1989, but it had failed to meet the FIA’s crash test requirements. First Racing abandoned their F1 project but the single chassis they had built was available, so Vita bought it and renamed it the L190. A couple of ex-Ferrari engineers were brought in to modify the chassis to accommodate the engine and get it to meet the crash test requirements. By the middle of February the work on the chassis was finished.

Vita now needed driver. With less than a month before the first race in Phoenix they would be hard to come by. Somehow Gary Brabham was asked to drive for the team. Brabham, the son of three time F1 champion Jack Brabham, had been on the fringes of F1 for a while. He had tested for Leyton House, Brabham and Benneton and likely saw the Life drive as his last chance to get into F1. Vita saw Brabham as a known figure, giving the team some credibility and as an English speaker could help him sell his engines to other teams. It was rumoured that part of Brabham’s contract was he would get a commission on any engines he could sell to other teams. Life decided to forego testing and with one chassis and two engines headed out to Phoenix for the first race.

With 20 teams competing and as Life was a new entrant, they would be required to pre-qualify. When it finally did get out on the track to pre-qualify it was slow, dreadfully slow. Brabham only got in 4 laps before the engine blew up, but his best time was 30 seconds slower than Senna’s pole time from 1989 and ultimately 35 seconds slower than Berger who took pole. After failing to qualify the team packed up and went to the next race in Brazil. In Brazil the mechanics, who hadn’t been paid, decided to go on strike and sent out Brabham to pre-qualify without any oil in his engine. Brabham went a couple of hundred yards before the engine blew. He got out of the car and quit.

Back in Europe for the San Marino GP, Life was looking for a new driver. Somehow they were able to convince Bruno Giacomelli to drive for them. Giacomelli, who had once driven for McLaren, Alfa Romeo and Toleman, was presently Leyton House’s test driver. He hadn’t driven in an F1 race since 1983 with Toleman and with his F1 career effectively over, the Life drive was as he admitted simply a way to stay in F1 and be with his friends.

Things didn’t get any better with Giacomelli at Imola. Suffering engine and chassis problems he posted a time of 7:16.212, while Senna did a 1:23.220 for pole. Next was Monaco – he did a 1:41.187 while Senna’s pole time was 1:21.314. Then Canada with a 1:50.253, while Berger posted a 1:30.514 for pole. And it continued like that all season.

After the Italian GP Life dropped the W12 engine and purchased a couple of year old Judd engines for the Portuguese GP. They finally got the Judd engines fitted the night before pre-qualification only to find that much of the rear bodywork no longer fit around the new engine. Without any time to make new body work they used gaffers tape to hold it on. As soon as Giacomelli got on track the body work started flying off. The FIA disqualified them.

A week later at Jerez for the Spanish GP with new body work that did fit and with the Judd engine, Life hoped they might be able to get through pre-qualification. It wasn’t to be. Giacomelli was 17 seconds slower than the slowest car to make it out of pre-qualification and 25 seconds slower than Senna’s pole. After the race Vita had had enough. He shut the team down.

In 14 attempts Life never made it out of pre-qualifying. Only once in pre-qualifying were they ever quicker than another team, and only then it was when a Coloni suffered a partial engine failure but continued simply to set a time.

Years later an Italian collector bought the chassis with a W12 engine and restored it. When the engine was restored he had it dyno tested and found it produced about 450HP, while Cosworth’s DFR produced around 600HP and Senna’s Honda RA100E around 700HP.

One final note about Life. Many people have said that Bernie Ecclestone’s obsession with having only 10 teams in F1 was to a great degree the result of seeing the Life team and wanting to make sure that another team like them never got anywhere near F1.

And that’s Life.

Article written by Cavallino Rampante (@CavallinoRampa2)

FIA WEC 6 HOURS OF SILVERSTONE

La superstagione del WEC riprende la pista 2 mesi dopo la 24 Ore di Le Mans, una pausa veramente lunghissima dovuta al particolare calendario di quest’anno. Si torna a Sliverstone in Gran Bretagna, gara che inizialmente era stata esclusa dal calendario, per poi trovare una collocazione a seguito del malcontento dei team britannici, come l’Aston Martin, a non avere una gara in casa. Ovviamente la tensione e pressione nelle gare dopo Le Mans è inevitabilmente minore, anche se questa stagione si articola su due 24 Ore, per cui già da Silverstone si possono mettere in pratica soluzioni per migliorare in vista delle altre gare e per la prossima Le Mans che sarà il gran finale della stagione. La Toyota arriva quindi senza ansie di sorta, avendo appena raggiunto l’obiettivo primario del programma WEC….per i giapponesi, l’altro grande obiettivo sarà fare una bella doppietta nel circuito di casa del Fuji in autunno. Le LMP1 private hanno avuto il tempo necessario per affinare lo sviluppo delle nuove auto e provare dei nuovi kit aerodinamici, illimitati per loro. Purtroppo ci sono 2 defezioni sull’entry list, infatti le Ginetta dopo aver saltato la tappa di Spa non correranno nemmeno a Silverstone, questa stagione si sta trasformando sempre più in un calvario, fra grossi problemi finanziari e prestazioni non all’altezza. Continua la lettura di FIA WEC 6 HOURS OF SILVERSTONE

Jean Alesi, ovvero un pilota dal grande futuro dietro alle spalle

1990, Gran Premio di Monaco a Montecarlo.

Ayrton Senna, come di consueto, è in pole position. Seguito dall’idolo dei ferraristi – e mio, all’epoca – Alain Prost. Subito dietro ad occupare la terza posizione c’è un giovanissimo pilota francese, campione di F3000 dell’anno precedente con il team di Eddie Jordan, un certo Jean Alesi. Guida una modesta, ma bellissima, Tyrrell caratterizzata da un’ala a forma di gabbiano all’anteriore. Precede monoposto ben più quotate, come l’altra McLaren-Honda di Gerhard Berger, la Ferrari dell’altro idolo Nigel Mansell e le due Williams-Renault di Riccardo Patrese e di Thierry Boutsen.

In gara, al semaforo rosso, pronti via, Jean ha uno scatto fulmineo.  Al Mirabeau affianca e sorpassa senza alcun complimento il professor Prost, che allarga e viene tamponato da Berger. Bandiera rossa. Tutto da rifare.

Quello è stato il momento in cui ho scoperto Jean Alesi. E, come spesso accade nelle storie d’amore, è stato odio a prima vista.

Continua la lettura di Jean Alesi, ovvero un pilota dal grande futuro dietro alle spalle